the photo on safety-aviation net strongly indicates that he was going out northward on 05.
OK so he took off from 05 and did a right turn. Perhaps he confused it in his mind, having previously planned to depart from 23 for which that would have been an appropriate turn. It could be that simple.
It is also illegal in most cases if you do this in IMC.
There are several things being confused.
Obviously nobody takes off in “IMC”, meaning zero vis. This is because you, ahem, can’t see the runway. In the US, a zero-zero departure (presumably using the heading bug; I did one in training and it works, on a good day) is legal, and it was legal in Europe, N-reg, until maybe 10 years ago.
You can take off safely in ~200m vis (which is what that webcam shows, roughly). It isn’t legal for private ops anywhere in Europe, however. The general min vis is 400m, and AD takeoff minima are likely higher. But this is not enforceable in the absence of official RVR measurement.
Having got airborne, you can enter solid cloud, or sufficient cloud to see nothing in any direction. That is not legal for a VFR-only pilot (obviously) but for an IR holder, in Class G, without an IFR clearance, is not illegal. However, this bit is country-specific. It seems that Austria has a 1500m min vis for VFR but that isn’t applicable to an IR holder unless there is a general prohibition in Austria on IFR deps from non-IAP (or non-towered, etc) airports and nobody seems to know the answer to that.
So yes, certainly illegal if the vis, pilot-interpreted, really was what the webcam shows, possibly unwise depending on pilot competence + aircraft systems, and certainly illegal if Austria prohibits IFR ops at LOIH.
Can you show me a SID to follow when departing from Sywell or Ouessant?
Not relevant to Austria. Sywell is UK (where IFR from a farm strip is legal, provided the pilot-interpreted vis is >400m) and Ouessant is France (no idea of French regs but they aren’t relevant here because this stuff is highly country-specific).
Mooney_Driver wrote:
The main objective discussing accidents amongst pilots is to learn from them.We again have an accident where a pilot thought it legal and wise to take off from a small non-IFR airfield in a mountaineous area with weather conditions which were below the defined minima for the airspace.
And again we get “professional” or “experienced” aviators trying to justify this and explain how it is done “safely” despite the fact that year after year we loose friends and colleagues to such hazardous behaviour.
@mooney_driver, agree with highlighted section – we discuss accidents to learn.
For some pilots that means just re-enforcing that mindset “unless the weather is really good, don’t takeoff from VFR airfield, it is illegal”.
For the others it is a completely legal manoeuver and they are trying to understand why it has happened, what went wrong.
Imagine it is year 2023 and that NPA 2020-02 is in place in EASA world, which means you can do IFR departures and arrivals from VFR airfields or airfields with no published procedures. Or if it was an uncontrolled IFR airfield with no radar and no published procedures.
What went wrong? Why has he crashed?
Yes, I understand that in this country it might have been illegal (although if I’m a member of the jury in criminal court I would not be able to say beyond reasonable doubt that the visibility was worse than 1500m just looking at the camera as can be very deceptive), but what has happened?
I cannot say that a person has crashed in his car because the seat belt was not on – it might have the reason why he died as it has contributed to the severity of the damage to his body, but not the reason of the crash. Did he lose control? Did the brakes fail? Did he suffer a cardiac arrest? Did someone shot him in the head?
I think that is the main reason for frustration in the discussion.
While I would not takeoff in similar circumstances, I’m trying to understand why did the qualifed and current pilot crash, so that I can avoid making that type of mistake.
Was it a pilot health issue? Or was it a plane? Or may be he realised that the weather is MUCH worse and was trying to return?
At the very beginning of this thread, I was still hoping that this wouldn’t derail (as usual) into the usual discussion about the legal subtleties of such departures, but deep inside I knew it would go that way. Instead, it would have been more interesting to discuss about the varying levels of relative risk of certain types of flight operations, how to mitigate these, etc. Oh well.
I have to say I still really enjoyed my popcorn. Funnily enough, not only did I know what legal arguments about such departures would come up (including all the country-specific nuances, training conventions, etc.). Even more funnily, I knew exactly WHO would come up and would bring WHICH argument. 
The usual suspects are appeared, reliably. The icing on the cake was the arrival here of a sim pilot to educate us.
So, it took us several pages to establish that EASA specifically allows Part-NCO IFR departures from airfields without IFPs. Let’s do a few more pages discussing whether any country authority designating airfields as “VFR-only” are violating said EASA regulation.
I too don’t like the way this thread got derailed into almost totally irrelevant gibberish. But what can one do? Delete any post not applicable to Austria? Some people just have to keep posting. Well, we had a guy here some years ago who was generating 1/3 of the total forum posts, 90% of them being completely irrelevant, and when he “left” / got moved / etc (multiple times) there was an uproar each time, mostly from his own countrymen, a bunch of whom left in solidarity, each time I will see what can be done on the next accident thread.
Nobody seems to know what the requirements in Austria (or LOIH) are – despite someone saying with great authority what they are.
Who is the sim pilot?
No more posts please unless they are relevant to Austrian regulations (or EU regulations applying to Austria) or the accident itself
Peter wrote:
Nobody seems to know what the requirements in Austria (or LOIH) are
I’m pretty sure @Snoopy knows.
BTW This is what’s written in Airport Manual at my base airport LDVA which is VFR only: “Flying in VMC only, according to SERA.5001 Regulation (EU) 923/2012 with following minima: horizontal visibility 1500m, constant ground visual contact, cloud entry prohibited.”
This must be the most useless thread ever on EuroGA. We are discussing an accident in AUSTRIA and people go on about legalities in France, UK, etc.
In any case IMO the legalities are totally irrelevant. What is of interest is why an instrument rated pilot who was even based locally made a wrong turn in a highly capable aircraft. Unfortunately I think we will never know, as the flight parameters seem to be consistent with a normal takeoff and climb. The only thing I can come up with is that he briefed a departure from one runaway, decided to take the other at the last minute without re-briefing and then became disoriented. RIP.
We are discussing an accident in AUSTRIA and people go on about legalities in France, UK, etc.
Yes; I will mod these differently in the future.
The only thing I can come up with is that he briefed a departure from one runaway, decided to take the other at the last minute without re-briefing and then became disoriented.
I think that’s probably what happened. I once landed on the opposite runway – in VMC!
Bosco’s comment about a “sim pilot” is quite derogatory. It seems to come from old conflicts on German domestic social media and those have no place here.
That you can’t depart on a Z flight plan?
That’s exactly what you do, and it is what one would have done in Austria, too – unless Austria allows filing “I” from LOIH (whether it does, does anybody actually know?). The flight plan might be useful to see but obviously nobody in ATC is going to disclose it.
boscomantico wrote:
it would have been more interesting to discuss about the varying levels of relative risk of certain types of flight operations, how to mitigate these, etc
+1
What does the last part mean? That you can’t depart on a Z flight plan?
You can but you have to remain VMC before getting IFR clearance (on the ground or in the air remaining VMC). If you obtain it on the ground (which is preferable), than you obviously can but respecting visual departure rules.
Similar accident from 2013
A joint sightseeing flight from the airfield Krems-Langenlois (LOAG) to Tyrol and back was planned for some time and was to be carried out on 20.10.2013.
At about 08:30 local time, the passenger and the pilot, after the latter had completed the flight preparations (home briefing), drove together by car from the pilot’s home to the Krems-Langenlois airfield (LOAG).
At the airfield there was dense fog. While still at the parking lot, the two discussed whether or not they should postpone their flight plan to a later date. The pilot, however, was of the opinion that “piercing the fog” would work. The passenger, who had no flying experience, trusted the pilot implicitly.
At the airfield tower, the two men met the airfield operations manager on duty and his aide, who handed the pilot the aircraft’s boarding papers.
The passenger stated that he had noticed that the pilot was talking to the on-duty operations manager regarding the weather conditions prevailing at the airfield.
When asked by the operations manager on duty about the dense fog as well as the planned takeoff time, the pilot replied, “We’ll be fine, we’ll punch through it!”
Shortly thereafter, the pilot and his passenger left the tower of the Krems-Langenlois airfield together to retrieve the rented aircraft from a hangar. Subsequently, the aircraft was refueled and the pilot entered the flight route into the GPS. The pilot then checked all the instruments again and performed all the scheduled checks and steered the aircraft onto the runway.
After being cleared for takeoff, the aircraft accelerated and took off after a short time. The aircraft climbed steeply. It literally pressed the passenger into the seat. The pilot said “from the knots, it fits!”.
The pilot also said “that we will soon be through or that we have made it”. These were the last words of the pilot to his passenger.
During the steep climb, the passenger’s photo camera, which he had placed on the side of the front window of the cockpit, suddenly fell down. He was now busy picking up the photo camera and looked down because of it. At this point in the flight, the fog layer had not yet broken through, nor was the climb suddenly noticeable.
At no time did the passenger notice any unusual sounds or noises, such as unusual engine noises or warning sounds within the aircraft, which would have indicated a possible technical problem with the aircraft.
Suddenly he heard it already “rustle”, looked up and saw trees directly in front of the machine. Immediately after that, collisions with several trees were already happening. It all happened very quickly.
1.2.2 Excerpts from the transcript of interrogation #2 of the passenger by the Regional Police Directorate of Lower Austria:
Supplementary to his testimony of 21.10.2013, the passenger stated the following on the day after the flight accident:
In the take-off phase, it was so that the aircraft had already almost penetrated the fog bank. He could perceive white, shiny fog himself. It had reached the transition from fog to sun. At this point, the pilot said, “Now we’re almost there.” Those were the pilot’s last words, meanwhile the passenger busied himself with setting up his camera, which had slipped off the instrument panel in the cockpit onto his thighs during takeoff.
In retrospect, the passenger wondered why the pilot did not react or speak during the crash. The passenger could not say whether the pilot had collapsed or slumped to the side during this phase, as he was busy with his photo camera and did not want to disturb it. The passenger would have believed that the pilot would have warned him with something like “we are crashing” or the like.
For this reason, the passenger could not rule out the possibility that the pilot had suffered a health problem such as a heart attack during the takeoff procedure.
1.2.3 Excerpts from the transcript of the interrogation of eyewitness “A”
(airfield operations manager) by the Provincial Police Directorate of Lower Austria:
On 20.10.2013, he was the eyewitness “A” (duty operations manager) at the airfield in Krems-Langenlois. After the latter had completed his control drive at approximately 07:50 (local time), he arrived at the tower of the airfield at approximately 08:00 (local time).
After the checks, he had noted the performance of these checks in his own notebook, which was available at the tower.
He further stated that he had not cleared the operational runway on the day of the accident. He did not remove the so-called blocking cross or signal cross. It is the case that the operations manager who closes the airfield at the end of his duties on the previous day puts up the barrier cross or signal cross. On the day of the accident, he did not remove it because it was foggy.
It is at the discretion of each operations manager to decide whether or not to open the airfield. Whether there are records or regulations in this regard, when one now opens or closes the airfield, he stated that he does not know.
He stated he had been a pilot and operations manager at the airfield for a number of years. He had been working full-time for the operations manager job at the airport. He had completed the one-day operations manager training course at Austro Control GesmbH for this purpose. On the day of the accident, the pilot and his passenger arrived at the tower at about 08:30 local time. The pilot had taken the aircraft papers for the aircraft. The papers were available at the tower.
He subsequently asked the pilot whether he really wanted to fly now because of the fog or whether he would like to wait. The pilot said that he still had to refuel and that he still had to make various preparations. Further, he can recall that the pilot said that they would be over the rest of the fog layer in a “whoosh.”
Regarding the weather, the operations manager stated that there was ground fog, but the ground fog was already dissipating.
Specifically asked if he alerted the pilot that the airfield was closed, he stated that he had not. Each pilot is responsible for himself.
The pilot left the tower with his passenger. He could still observe the pilot refueling the aircraft. After a while, the pilot radioed that he was now flying away.
The operations manager saw the aircraft take off in the area of the center square, that is, in front of the second taxiway. It was a normal takeoff. The aircraft had “not appeared steep” to him. It was a normal takeoff distance. He watched the aircraft until it disappeared into the fog. A few seconds after takeoff, a colleague came up to the tower and reported that he heard a “bang” and that the aircraft had probably crashed. He then immediately tried to make radio contact with the pilot, but this was no longer possible. Based on this, the operations manager immediately called 144. The aircraft that crashed was the only one that took off from the airfield that day.
1.2.4 Excerpts from the record of the interrogation of eyewitness “B” by the
Provincial Police Directorate of Lower Austria:
On the day of the accident, eyewitness “B”, who himself has pilot training, was at the airfield in front of the workshop there, which is located between the tower and the private hangar. When he heard the aircraft take off, he wanted to watch it take off. When he perceived the aircraft, it was already just in the air. He could see from his location about as far as the runway because of the fog. In his opinion, it was a normal climb. He estimated that the aircraft was already airborne in the area of the second taxiway. He figured that it would not be a problem for the pilot to take off in this fog since he was familiar with the area. The aircraft was not climbing excessively steeply. He watched the aircraft until it disappeared into the fog. He had heard a constant engine noise until it then collided with the trees. He would not have noticed that the pilot had reduced engine power. After hearing the crash, he ran up to the tower and notified the airfield operations manager. He asked the airfield operations manager if he had radio contact with the aircraft that had just taken off. The airfield manager answered in the affirmative and wanted to establish radio contact immediately, but this was no longer possible.
Together with fellow club members, eyewitness “B” drove in the direction of the accident site. When he arrived, he was completely surprised that the aircraft had crashed so close to the airfield. He was of the opinion that the aircraft should have been much further. He himself would not take off in such weather conditions when the visibility was at most 100-150 meters.
