The issue here Peter is that there is no such thing as precedent, because you cant have a precedent if there is no mechanism for independently examining the case before regulatory action. The only current mechanism is to refuse to comply, in which event, as we have discussed, the threat is an action under the ANO with all that involves and which tends to put most off. i suspect in a case like this in reality the CAA would withdraw before it got to Court because presumably they know full well the equipment is not tolerant to 100 feet or what ever, but unfortunately this is not the point. I do wish someone with a bit of money and a point to prove would take it on, but, as I say I expect the CAA would very quickly cave it so even this course would achieve very little.
There’s another nice one in the July MORs:
Infringement of the LTMA (Class A) by xxxx east of OCK squawking 7047, indicating 2600ft. [100ft into CAS]
CAA Closure:
Investigation Findings: Pilot error. Root Cause: Pilot distracted looking for canopies/parachutes out of the window. Remedial Action(s) Taken: Advice sent regarding
Threat and Error Management.
Plenty of other +100ft cases again MORd.
Also interesting multiple MORs concerning ATC coordination screwups between Solent and surrounding units – no surprise to regulars – and these got MORd too so lots of ar*se covering going on. One plane involved got MORd as an infringement as a result.
Lots of busts of the new Farnborough CAS. Gonna keep “Gasco” busy when they restart their “courses” 
One pilot got MORd on a French-UK flight for climbing by 500ft (500ft into CAS) when avoiding conflicting traffic on TCAS. Unbelievable, given that the ATC unit would have seen the other one too.
Investigation Findings: Pilot error. Root Cause: Pilot distracted looking for canopies/parachutes out of the window. Remedial Action(s) Taken: Advice sent regarding
Threat and Error Management.
I would have thought keeping a look out for parachute canopies was pretty high on the threat management scale.
flybymike wrote:
I would have thought keeping a look out for parachute canopies was pretty high on the threat management scale.
But on the CAA scale it’s below busting airspace. These 100ft ones are totally crazy. Presumably the proposed Brize and Oxford Kidlington airspace expansion will only make these worse.
Off_Field wrote:
Presumably the proposed Brize and Oxford Kidlington airspace expansion will only make these worse.
Isn’t it proposed TMZ now and not Class D?
Good point arj1, I can’t remember which is E+ E or D, TMZ or RMZ. presumably if you have the wrong code selected and you bust the E+ you could be in for a visit to a re-education camp.
Off_Field wrote:
Good point arj1, I can’t remember which is E+ E or D, TMZ or RMZ. presumably if you have the wrong code selected and you bust the E+ you could be in for a visit to a re-education camp.
Even those who have a chair or say in that topic lost track of what is proposed now
I think they should have sticked an RMZ to Oxford and put a cake of E on top of Brize !
Only UK ATC offers IFR traffic Deconfliction Service in Class G with 5nm/3000ft separation against unknown traffic with unknown flight rules in CAVOK VMC conditions, this mess goes really deep
@Off_Field, I think it is only TMZ, no special codes, just valid XPDR.
Which is weird – I would’ve thought that TMZ+E would be much better, but for some reason they think it is not…
Or I could’ve missed something in that PDF file!
The redesign from D to TMZ in part 6:
https://www.oxfordairport.co.uk/the-airport/public-consultation-2/
In the UK it’s actually a valid mode S transponder.
I still can’t get over the idea that it’s London Oxford. Oxford is nowhere near London.
