Once I pull the mixture and cut the ignition I’m committed, it’s like in a glider. Enjoy the silence and concentrate on landing.
During this discussion, I see references to optimizing the glide – yes, but…. When I teach forced approaches, I do not try to optimize the glide distance, but rather the glide itself, to get me to the correct approach position toward a suitable landing zone. Though a stretched glide (the 210 in Australia recently) may be necessary, it’s not what I teach. I would prefer a not stretched glide, to a more close spot (even if not as appealing), if doing that assures a controlled forced landing. The 210 pilot demonstrated awesome skill, and made the very best of a horrible situation. That’s an exception. Too often, a pilot in a real forced landing situation over estimates the ability to glide a distance, and has a bad outcome at the very last, ’cause the plane just will not get to the top of the flare with enough reserve to flare and arrest the descent.
I would rather choose a more close spot, and fly a circling, slipping if necessary forced approach. You can focus on a cause check, and be less stressed, if you know that you’re going to make your spot no problem, and now can do everything to make a good landing when you get there. One of my mentors used to say: “point it where you can crash it, and don’t crash when you get there.”. There’s more to that than the apparently flippant attitude. Select a spot you know you can make, don’t fuss up your entire approach trying to reach a far spot, and then either not making it and hitting the stone wall at the beginning, or losing control just as you flare. If you’re going to misjudge, run off the far end of your touchdown zone at 20 knots, than into the stone wall at the beginning at 65 knots!
Whether you actually try an engine shutdown, and prop stop or not is less important than being able to make a good power off approach and flare to a descent landing. Sure, knowing how well your plane glides with the prop stopped is a nice to know, but if you’re going to use that tidbit of knowledge to try to stretch a glide more, I would recommend against it. Land close, sideslip if needed, and allow yourself the room in your forced approach to extend flaps and gear (if the surface suits) for slower, more normal landing.
As for starter motor duty cycle, many airplanes to not specify. But, those which do (with the same starter) commonly state: 30 seconds engaged, 30 seconds off, 30 seconds engaged, 5 minutes off, 30 seconds engaged, 30 minutes off. I have seen melted starter motors. I would prefer a windmill start, if you have the altitude to do it. But, even if you need to use the starter for an in flight restart, it should be less burdensome to the starter, as it will be getting a windmill assist! Just make sure that you have everything set for the start. In flight, under some pressure/rush, you might forget something which on the ground, using your checklist, you might have got right!
Yes; I was taught to find a field nearby, largely because it is easier to inspect the surface / lack of people, etc.
Another thing not quite mentioned is why the engine stopped. If a piston is sticking up through the cowling, no use trying alternate air, etc 
This is a nasty one, has happened to a number of people I know, and most of them don’t go public with it. It leaves no evidence post-crash, too.
The LOP mag check is a good method and is safe if done correctly.
maxbc wrote:
But you’re still endangering the flight because a successful restart is not guaranteed
The point obviously, is that a restart is not required, I mean – at all. The point is not to add risk. Not that a fully functional engine won’t (normally) restart, it’s just that it’s an added risk which is not necessary for the exercise.
There are stories about one (in)famous instructor here who used to pull a nasty trick on the unknowing students. He used to say to the student: look at me, then he turned the ignition off, pulled out the key and threw it out the window Of course, the student was more worried if he had taken to the skies with a complete madman, than actually worrying about the in flight emergency procedures. After a while, the instructor pulled out a second key and turned the mags on.
maxbc wrote:
But in the comparison with skydiving, jumping with a parachute is the whole point of the activity, and all the SOP / rules around the activity are designed with that in mind. Accepted level of risk is part of this context too
Yes, but not being willing to shut down the engine in a controlled training environment, with no added risk at all, is like saying you don’t accept the risk of an engine failure, even if the risk is clearly there. IMO, this is a fairly normal mindset. The risk of engine failure is regarded as small as being insignificant. Yet it happens fairly often. The usual reason it happens is lack of fuel (the engine is just fine), but that doesn’t mean it cannot happen to you.
LeSving wrote:
Yes, but not being willing to shut down the engine in a controlled training environment, with no added risk at all, is like saying you don’t accept the risk of an engine failure, even if the risk is clearly there. IMO, this is a fairly normal mindset. The risk of engine failure is regarded as small as being insignificant. Yet it happens fairly often. The usual reason it happens is lack of fuel (the engine is just fine), but that doesn’t mean it cannot happen to you.
In the end, the important question is if the expected increased likelihood of carry out a successful real engine ot landing by training with an intentionally shut down engine outweight the risks with an intentional shutdown. Because – contrary to what you claim – there is a risk involved with shutting down the engine even in a controlled training environment.
This is similar to why spins were abandoned in basic flight training and Vsse was used instead of Vmca for engine-out training on twins. The risks – although small – were large enough to offset the training value.
Airborne_Again wrote:
The risks – although small – were large enough to offset the training value.
Show me the numbers and the statistics Also, everything is dangerous, if you don’t know exactly how to do it safely. As I said, I’m not so sure if shutting down the engine (for real) even is relevant for the training aspect of the exercise. You should be able to get that aircraft down regardless of minute, or not so minute changes in L/D. Just a slight wind will offset your perception of L/D vs the ground by huge amounts. Besides, in a real engine off situation, the goal is to survive, not to do a perfect 3 pointer at a runway.
It’s more the experience itself, and your trust in the aircraft that probably increases. For me, the first landing with no engine (except in gliders) came as an emergency. It worked out just fine, and I did a perfect 3 pointer on the runway But, I had to change runway at the “last minute” because I misjudged the L/D. My initial plan was to do a normal landing upwind, but ended up doing a an extra turn to lose some height and landing downwind instead. Would I have aimed for a downwind landing at once, if I had done some real engine off training up front? There’s no way of knowing. But at least I would have the experience, and that’s one uncertainty less the brain has to worry about in an emergency.
The reason why engine out emergencies go bad, is usually due to poorly executed emergency landings. Typically stalling out at low altitude. The ability to focus on the task is obviously important. Getting “unknowns” out of your brain will help you do that, in my humble opinion. That, and injecting as much relevant experience as possible
For some reason this came up on my YouTube just now. Highly relevant, and really interesting.
LeSving wrote:
The point obviously, is that a restart is not required, I mean – at all.
I understand and agree with your point about not adding unnecessary risk. But if you don’t restart (or are slower to go around, etc.) there is added risk in all training situations.
Even if you’re above a runway, the risk is not huge but still present (you may do a circling, screw up in the last phase and fall short). And this situation is not the most helpful to estimate glide.
In general, during any exercise and training, there’s always the possibility to go around, and that’s part of the point (you can fail with no consequences). Prepare for the dangerous situation while staying safe (i.e. having power at your disposal).
Imagine you’re doing a power-off circling above a runway, and someone penetrates on the runway when you’re on short base leg. You turn back around maybe 30s before landing. What do you do then ?
Not even talking about off-field exercises since that wasn’t your point (that bit is self-obvious).
LeSving wrote:
Yes, but not being willing to shut down the engine in a controlled training environment, with no added risk at all, is like saying you don’t accept the risk of an engine failure, even if the risk is clearly there.
Erm… what ? Choosing how you train has nothing to do with accepting the risk of what you train for.
I think what you mean is “not accepting the risk of shutting down the engine in a controlled training environment means you also don’t accept the risk of an engine failure in general”. And there comes the difference between triggering and training to treat. I can accept the risk of an engine failing, this could happen a few times in my lifetime flying, I just don’t conduct any action that would increase the chance of it happening (by making the probability 100%, possibly many times for training) if I can avoid it.
In this debate the case must really be made that an actual engine out exercise is substantially better than a simulated engine out (i.e. idling) to compensate for the added risk, risk which mainly consists of the possibility of not being able to go around (forgetting something during the restart procedure, slow hot start, etc., and simply added delay of starting the engine before having power available).
You also need extra justification to deviate from accepted, regular and common engine out training, which cutting the power is definitely not.
I’m not saying it can never be done safely. But the conditions to do so are so specific, and must be so thoroughly thought out and briefed that I would not recommend it for most people or as a regular training method.
I sent Peter a rather large video file of my doing a shutdown test of the RED A-03 diesel engine in the Sealand DHC-2 Beaver. If Peter will paste the video into this post, I’ll add a description….
