He pushed the throttle too far – that’s it. Then when he realised, he pulled it back too far. Running at 46" instead of 44" for a few seconds won’t do any harm, and trying to take off at 15% under takeoff power is a worse idea.
The correct procedure, especially on a marginal runway, is to set and stabilise the engine power with the brakes firmly on, then release the brakes and don’t touch the throttle.
A bit of quick math says that at >5% overweight and ~15% under power, the runway required will increase by about 25%. And that’s an underestimate because it doesn’t take into account wind resistance increasing with speed. To get the proper figure involves a differential equation that I can’t be bothered to figure out, but it’s probably >30%.
His takeoff roll at gross should have been 1950ft of runway used, measuring using Google Maps and the pictures in the report, the point at which he reached 71kt was about 2100 ft since the start of the takeoff roll (and he still had 7 more knots worth of acceleration to do before book liftoff speed) so the 25% estimate would seem pretty close.
The piston PA46 at MTOW uses a LOT of runway, and the climb performance after takeoff is really meagre for the first few hundred m.
In the one I flew for 7 years the POH allowed for a “short field” takeoff with 20 degrees flaps and a rotation speed of 68 kts. I used that all the time on a 750 m grass runway and it shaved something like 150m off the takeoff roll.
The idea that you could ever put 6 normal sized adults on a PA46, even with no fuel, and be below MTOW is absurd. A PA 46 is a 3 to 4 person plane max, max.
> 45.3 inch manifold pressure
I hThe turbo controller is actually quite precise and 3.3 inch overboost does not just happen. The setup of this engine was
completely wrong. A clear maintenance problem.
I once flew a PA46 Mirage like this one where the manifold pressure was set to just make about 38 inches. That plane did not reach POH take off performance figures by a far margin until this was adjusted to 42 inches.
I did quite some short field practice with the PA46 Mirage years ago. The PA46 really transforms from a sports car to a lorry with weight. Light it is a real performer. Heavy, I did once witness an overweight take off on a ferry many years ago, it will use a lot of runway but then climb out. You will want 1000-1200m in such a case.
The POH is not very good. The PA46 can actually outperform book take off numbers by a wide margin but 20° flaps and a rotation speed adjusted for weight will have to be used. Unfortunately Piper did not list much data when doing the POH.
Finally with all criticisim at least the captain did recognize the problem and took the right decision, even if it puts him into a lot of trouble now. That should be respected. Too many would just have continued!
I am sure the captain would have had no problem performing the take off by adjusting the manifold pressure close to 42 inches. So do not let anybody take the controls during take off or landing!
Operating the Pa46 with the serial number very very close to G-LAMI (only 4 aircraft in between), I was astonished, that someone puts 6 adults in this plane and on top he filled up fuel of about half. Wrong airplane with the wrong commander! Overweight, short runway and not the right take off power. Shit in, shit out like a computer.
Dan wrote
But speculations have no place in a factual accident report. Armchair pilots can do all the speculation they want. Maybe insurance companies will. An enquiry board should certainly refrain from making them.
Obviously you don’t read many accident reports. In recent times, they are rampant with speculation, accusation and often safety recommendations which throw out whole classes of airplanes with one sentence. Also, assuming that these reports wonˆt find their way into the legal prosecutions case is utterly naive, even if not all TSB’s are open about it.
And as for POH’s they are often very lacking.
However, as a former airline pilot I think you’d agree that if there is no data, then it doesn’t get done. PERIOD.
So if the POH has no hard data for take off with flaps 10 or 20, then for me, this option does not exist, even if it is mentioned in the POH for soft field e.t.c. Again, without POH data, if we are strict, we should also not perform any operation which is not there.
Unfortunately this is not always practicable.
Many SEP’s do not have data for grass or wet or iced runways. What most people don’t realize however is that if they do operate like this anyway, the TSB’s will tear them to bits.
Anyway, this particular case is so gross in terms of negligence and ignorance by the PIC, that I reckon he will end up paying lots of money back to the insurance. Over gross is absolutely no go. Then screwing up the power setting shows lack of skill. This take off was cringeworthy in every respect. So you can neither blame the POH nor the manufacturer but this case is as human error as it gets.
31 k hours is a lot, yes, but it depends what they were flown in and how. The JU Air Disaster has shown beyond any scope of imagination that especcially high hour skygods are prone to make catastrophic mistakes. This case here proves that point.
Not only did this gentlemen so extremely misread the fuel he had on board, he also did not do the load and balance as required. I bet he did no even fill in a load sheet for the files and if he did it is garbage in, garbage out.
This was a brand new PA46 ruined by an operation which can only be called negligent to the may. One might speculate, tongue in cheek, that he learnt his trade with the French state carrier….
A lot of current or ex airline pilots have lots of accidents in GA. I hear stories quite regularly about a syndicate where one 20k+ hr member kept crashing stuff, or where one 20k+ hr renter kept crashing stuff…
Why? It’s not hard to find likely reasons, with #1 being that big jets have fantastic performance advantages, enough to get you out of the worst cockups. A 737 loaded with 150 [insert your favourite country with high obesity levels] and cabin baggage way over average, needs only ~50% of the standard big airline-airport runway (say 2500m) to lift off. Then, fantastic ice protection, wx radar… it’s a long list. And yes a 2nd pilot doing the radio etc. Well, unless it is a Concorde with substandard maintenance, crazy overfuelling practices, a crew which pushes everything to the limit as standard, and is carrying tons of undeclared luggage, assisted by somebody on the ground disposing of the loading records 
Accident report quality varies widely, according to political implications. The AAIB is better than some but it is normal for lawyers to press them and then they have to remove some stuff.
Mooney_Driver wrote:
Obviously you don’t read many accident reports
Mooney_Driver wrote:
as a former airline pilot I think you’d agree
Maybe we could refrain from personal speculation here?
Peter wrote:
A lot of current ex airline pilots have lots of accidents in GA
A bit excessively expressed, but there is a point.
The as to why you give is probably one reason, not sure it is the driver here.
As I stated somewhere above, complacency is a big factor. Doing something asking repetitive tasks, such as reading Notams and Wx, reading and performing checklists, reciting briefings, etc, day in day out, make all airline pilots become complacent to a certain point once in their career this has become routine…
Add to this the level of psychological comfort provided by the soft cushion of experience (seen it all attitude) and the sheer amount of hours as a number, topped by a continuous exposure to the aviation environment.
Lack of respect regarding the performance limitations, and sometimes peculiar handling, of the small SEP brethren in general is another factor.
In a nutshell, I would say that what makes an airline pilot dangerous in a light airplane is attitude. Or the lack of.
Speaking of experience, some insurance companies used to love high hour count and ATPL ratings… and this is changing as I speak. One will now get best rates if not above 1K hours (but above 500…), with an IR or CFI, no older than 60…
Last but certainly not least… the more one flies, the more one exposes himself to the risk. Of making one mistake, two mistakes, etc. Armchair flyers will have super safe flying records for sure.
The aficionado using his UL or SEP to fly more than the ridiculously low amount required will de facto put himself at a greater risk… of being a mere human
Dan wrote:
But speculations have no place in a factual accident report.
I disagree. What you call “speculation” was entirely justified. An accident report is not just a “factual report”. If that was case the AAIB could dispense with the analysis part and save a lot of time and effort. We would also be not much the wiser as how to avoid accidents in the future.
The purpose of an accident investigation is not just to explain what happened but also why it happened. This includes looking at decisions made and what the outcome would have been otherwise. Here the question was if the pilot’s decision to abort the takeoff contributed to an accident or not. The conclusion of the AAIB was that it did not as a decision to continue the takeoff would most likely have resulted in a worse accident. If the takeoff path had been entirely free from obstacles, then the decision to abort may very well have been put in question.
Dan wrote:
Speaking of experience, some insurance companies used to love high hour count and ATPL ratings… and this is changing as I speak. One will now get best rates if not above 1K hours (but above 500…), with an IR or CFI, no older than 60…
Maybe insurance rates should be based also on aircraft flight time? Clearly the risk is greater for an aircraft that flies 200 hrs/year compared to one that flies 20 hrs/year – assuming equal pilot competence and currency.
[Edit: greater risk, of course…]
