Thomas_R wrote:
I think the key is to focus on your aiming point and not on the terrain in front of it. Of course, hitting the terrain in front of it should still be avoided, and especially in Megève, there are some high trees in front of the runway
That’s the basic of mountain flying… you have to detect very early that you are low or too much Aoa and cannot recover, and any correction must be decisive, not fluffy.
It looks like the explanation is quite clear. He went back to level flight without increasing power, so it seems to be a case of not looking at the airspeed indicator and forgetting to set correct power vs attitude change. Something that could happen on any airport, irrespective of mountain. It’s much more dangerous on an altiport obviously, but this seems like a contributing factor only. In a normal field you would have a little more altitude as a (small) energy reserve, instead of having to resort to engine power alone (in the back of the power curve no less).
There was no strong headwind factor apparently.
I agree that the probable cause is not clearly stated. It could read something like: “the pilot’s failure to maintain airspeed by applying proper power when entering level flight from descent, and failure to react to the subsequent stall warning”.
Edit: I even think the report is somewhat contradictory. The FI tried to correct things at the last moment but had no impact on the error itself. It would have happened the same if he wasn’t there (of course, the pilot wouldn’t have attempted the flight, but still). The thinness of the training required for the rating is a factor, but only contributing. He should’ve been on the correct glidepath, but it happens to not be. It’s not a sole reason for crash. Not applying proper power on attitude change is the sole and sufficient reason for the crash.
maxbc wrote:
It looks like the explanation is quite clear. He went back to level flight without increasing power
That is the final detail but when flying a big part of the entire final approach in level flight the approach was already outside any limits before turning final. Sure the approach could have been saved but that would only have been damage control so to speak. Actually I think when the plane did level off it was probably even before the point of no return. At Courchevel you can still turn away from final but only about half way down the final approach. I once actually did it right after turning final and it was no issue.
Understand. The descent profile really matters.
Still, 50cm below threshold doesn’t seem too hard to reach with a little more speed / power. Had he not stalled or near-stalled (more power in the last 10 seconds would’ve been enough), he would’ve made it to the runway.
maxbc wrote:
Still, 50cm below threshold doesn’t seem too hard to reach with a little more speed / power.
Yes it was close, but also close in the opposite direction. A bit lower can it would have been 3 dead. Somehwere else I read that the passenger did not wear a seatbelt else it migth have been survivable.
Getting slow on short final in general is scary. I had this happen once and had to carry the plane to the landing zone. My backup strategy was to not do any roundout or flare but simply fly the plane directly into the landing not to risk a stall by any pulling on the elevator. I also got a bit low on very short final once but fortunately with reserve speed so I could simply pull a bit.
Obviously adding power helps when getting slow but looking at the DA42 accident and the other Piper Meridian accidents, which as a result of recovering from slow speed did an overrun, it is very difficult to judge when adding a surge of power is enough and when to cut it again. Also I have experienced a similar “visual fixation” on the runway as discussed in the report which then results in not enough attention on the speed…
Dan wrote:
The presence of a passenger in the right seat, if the passenger is a more experienced pilot or even an instructor, is likely to change the management of certain flight phases in certain contexts. In such cases, the pilot in command may delegate part of his judgment to the person accompanying him. The risks associated with this configuration can be reduced by defining a clear division of roles prior to the flight, and by a shared awareness that this context may pose a potential threat to flight safety.
What’s your opinion on sharing tasks in the cockpit in case non-MCC environment?
Emir wrote:
What’s your opinion on sharing tasks in the cockpit in case non-MCC environment?
I was warned by the instructor during the briefing for Couchevel of this very scenario. A senior pilot with many hours but little mountain experience on the right seat. This might give you a wrong sense of security while the experience of this senior pilot does not help and he/she is subject to the same optimal illusions about the proper approach path as everybody else doing this for the first time.
The key seems to do a proper briefing. Speak about all steps of the approach so the copilot does know what is coming. Then assign clear tasks for the final approach. What has worked for me is to tell the copilot to announce every few second the IAS. So even if you look out a bit too much you notice when you get too fast or too slow. Also tell them to simply announce the numbers. Saying just “check airspeed” will be fine at other occasions but in this case the exact number helps a lot more.
@Emir, here goes, in 2 1/2 words: it can be beneficial. And certainly should not be detrimental.
That was easy no?
Seriously now, like probably most around here, I have flown hundred of hours (say in the region of 6-700) in SEPs sharing the controls of an aircraft that we were either renting, or had common shares in, 2 pilot friends sitting in the front… what we usually did, the more so if on a trip lasting more than a couple of days, would be to swop roles every day, or every leg, one doing the flying only, the other assuming R/T and nav duties. The people I did this flying with were certainly very nice since I can’t recall a single instance of inflight disagreement. I recall 1 or 2 occasions when we had a post flight debrief, all for the good.
The problem probably arises in exactly the situation given on this accident flight. The PIC should have precisely briefed the flight beforehand, and assigned duties if he felt wanting to. The “PNF”, the more so if ATPL and FI qualified, should have queried the same in case it was not mentioned or discussed.
The above case the situation was rendered more complicated thru the fact that the PNF did not have a mountain rating (or Courchevel permit), did not know the aircraft, but was an FI and held an ATPL:
Âgé de 35 ans, il détenait une licence de pilote de ligne ATPL(A) en état de validité, assortie d’une qualification SEP et d’une qualification d’instructeur FI en état de validité. Il ne disposait pas d’expérience de vol en montagne hormis quelques vols réalisés en tant que pilote à la Réunion et quelques atterrissages à Courchevel en tant que passager.
Deepl:
Aged 35, he held a valid ATPL(A) airline transport pilot licence, together with a valid SEP rating and FI instructor rating. He had no mountain flying experience apart from a few flights as a pilot on Reunion Island and a few landings in Courchevel as a passenger.
PS
I have to mention that a similar situation, just speaking about such a relationship or CRM, arose when @Antonio invited me on his outing to Peyresourde during the last EuroGA meet…
Sebastian_G wrote:
Yes it was close, but also close in the opposite direction. A bit lower can it would have been 3 dead. Somehwere else I read that the passenger did not wear a seatbelt else it migth have been survivable.
Yep. They did a completely “flat” approach for the last 2 km according to the report. That is just suicidal. I can still hear my mountain instructor (rightfully) complain when we were 0,1% below the 5% “glide slope” that is generally used when approaching an altiport or altisurface. You just need that potential energy for all kinds of circumstances like downdrafts, etc.
