Well, the above jet accident is not really hard to understand: Flew against all rules, obviously with little system knowledge and even when the plane was without engines they waited until they could not reach an airport. It really needs a lot of igorance to NOT reach one of six airports available at FL410 …
AF747 IS hartd to understand, but I am sure that the answers lie in the PSYCHOLOGY of the situation. The Borgen Air 757 on the other hand was really tragic …
I think “we” GA pilots find some jet accidents hard to understand because the way we fly is so different. AF447 comes to mind – it’s incomprensible how they could have sat there for four minutes doing all those things and not noticing stuff like a ~15 deg UP indication on the PFDs. I think the whole initial (type rating) and recurrent training culture is different and so far removed from the basics that when something basic goes wrong some of the crews can’t work it out. That B757 with the taped-over static vents was another one.
I think no training regime prevents stupid things. It just opens up ways of doing different stupid things. And anybody spending more than a few days hanging out at some FTO and watching some of the clientele will see that if there is a hole somewhere to be found, a good number of them will find it.
Stupidity – with the crew making so many mistakes, it is hard to disagree with that analysis. However, calling someone stupid does not make anyone wiser or prevent any accidents.
I can easily relate to wanting to do something a little out of the ordinary in a way that is impossible when flying scheduled flights with passengers. Actually I often do the same – flying alone, I try things that I for reasons of comfort or added workload do not do with passengers (or students). So for me, the accident is another reminder to be alert, prepared and disciplined whenever expanding my personal flying envelope. I like to think that is what I usually am, but so did the two poor pilots in that accident probably also.
It reminds me slightly of an old National Airlines DC-10 accident (U.S., November 3, 1973). The captain and the flight engineer played with the autothrottle controls resulting in the no. 3 engine overspeeding and disintegrating, with debris damaging no. 1 and 2 engine and breaking a cabin window, resulting in the passenger in seat 17H being sucked out. – I could easily see myself as being that captain. Maybe it is a good thing that I am a GA pilot with enough workload to keep me busy without inventing new elements of danger. – Sorry I let the thread drift off …
Now THAT’S an accident chain! Talk about lining up the holes………
Disagree. There was only one hole – pure and utter stupidity. Actually, make that two holes – one for each pilot.
Kinda reminded me of this CRJ-200 “crash”…
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pinnacle_Airlines_Flight_3701
Now THAT’S an accident chain! Talk about lining up the holes………
Kinda reminded me of this CRJ-200 “crash”…
Probably Pull #19.
I don’t think so.
As I recall, that started out as a VMC into IMC at something like 10000, they then encountered icing and pulled. I might have remembered the detail wrong but am pretty sure they weren’t pushing the SC.
If it had been an icing incident at above the 17500 handbook limitation altitude (based on the climb performance of mine at FL 170, I think that an SR22 NA would actually have a SC above 20000 but is limited to 17500 by the POH) then, by the time it had got down to the 6000 at which the pilot pulled, I would bet on the speed being well above VNE (204KIAS) and an outcome similar to that in Event 5 at Norden when an icing incident at 16000 ft (so well below the SC) resulted in such a descent and the chute detached from the aircraft when it deployed probably faster than 300 KTS.
I have also had a quick look through the list given in the link Sjoerd posted and have to say I can’t find any reference to the circumstances in your earlier post. Are you sure it was a Cirrus?
Probably Pull #19.
Factors: icing induced high-speed descent followed by parachute activation, Activation: high altitude, 6,000 feet; Weather: VMC; Landing: uneven rocky terrain
I don’t think the wx was “VMC” although it may have been by the time they reached the surface 
Loads of aircraft accident reports say “VMC” in the accident report even when it is absolutely obviously IMC – they seem to base it on the V or I in the flight plan, or as declared to ATC. Also nobody is going to tell the NTSB they were IMC if the PIC doesn’t have an IR.
Have a look here: https://www.cirruspilots.org/copa/safety_programs/w/safety_pages/720.caps-saves-and-fatal-accidents.aspx
