On gear warning systems, aircraft with modern avionics could get a warning which actually says (in whatever language the avionics are set to use) “Warning, landing gear not extended” through the intercom if:
This may be a better wake up call for people such as in the infamous TB gear up video.
With GPWS systems you get a “five hundred” feet warning above any ground (airport or not) which is a good wakeup call too. This does it too, for rather less money…
But then, as very accurately pointed out already, hearing is one of the first things to be lost when the workload goes up.
I know of a few TB owners who installed the KRA10 radar altimeter but none of them linked it into their gear warning, which seems a huge missed opportunity for the ~10k which they paid for it. I guess the avionics installer was afraid of doing it because there is no ready wiring diagram for it, for a TB20.
I too use checklists only
Here’s my transcription:
Pilot: “I would so much like to have a Cessna 182”
Copilot: “Yes, me too but nobody wants to buy that TB20”
Pilot: “What should we do?”
Copilot: “Maybe sell it to the insurance company?”
Pilot: “Great idea, let’s leave the gear up.”
Dublin, the assumption was checklists on the ground, not in the air. Agree 100% that a checklist in a VFR aircraft in a busy circuit is an impending disaster, hence GUMPS, appears to work well.
Oh, in the Bonanza, as in a YAK 50, the gear comes down to slow you down, acting as one large airbrake..
Isn’t there a pretty easy answer on the core question: using checklists and working in a clear workflow. Even in the VFR traffic circuit the workflow has to be fix.
IMHO flying a a/c with a RG – thus a complex a/c – requires the PIC learing and using dedicated workflows including the useage of checklists. And as many other answers here show, the very very final check is supposed to be ‘three green’. For the DA42 the situation is not difficult at all since one nearly almost need the gear to reduce the speed, so the workflow sequence is simple: gear down first, that landing flaps 1st position, landing flap full at the very end. Reminding this sequence you nearly cannot forget the landing gear since you would almost not be able to land the a/c.
However, for the DA42 the gear up landing is not even that kind of a desaster: the props have to be replaced of course, and the gearbox. No shock landing AFAIK for the engines due to the gearbox. And the body-damages are not that significant, the big engine blocks and the rear footstep (!) are covering most of the impact.
I don’t buy the Everyone can (and, as I read, will one day, sooner or later) forget to drop gear argument. That is one of those sayings that is just incorrect and an excuse for sloppiness.
Agree 100%
For the DA42 the situation is not difficult at all since one nearly almost need the gear to reduce the speed
Yet last month a guy made gear up landing in Zadar. And that’s what I can’t understand (and it’s the same for TB20 and DA42) – the speed and the angle are so different in gear up and gear down approach that you have to notice that something is not right.
The problem is that there can always be something that distracts you so much that you don’t become aware of the different flight characteristics.
The only way IMHO to prevent it happenimng for sure is to always use (or just say!) a final checklist.
I can’t imagine being distracted not to notice first thing that I have to do in aircraft: flying it. OK, I can imagine but it’s not for this forum to be disclosed 
I can’t imagine being distracted not to notice first thing that I have to do in aircraft: flying it.
Yet last month a guy made gear up landing in Zadar. And that’s what I can’t understand (and it’s the same for TB20 and DA42) – the speed and the angle are so different in gear up and gear down approach that you have to notice that something is not right.
In the case of the TB20, I think that was in fact the distraction!
I could be wrong, but I think this scenario is one distinct possibility:
The airport (from memory) is a one way airport. You and take off and land from opposite directions, irrespective of the wind, due to a significant slope. Also due to slope, a go around is next to impossible late in the approach. (You can’t outclimb the slope).
If I’m correctly remembering that, then the guys were probably very concerned that they got down at the begining of the runway at the correct speed, because they couldn’t go around.
Speed was foremost on their mind, almost to the exclusion of all else.
The steep approach wasn’t familiar to them, but they had to do a steep approach to clear the terrain.
They were surprised by the extra speed, but thought it due to the steeper than normal approach to clear the terrain.
They became fixated on the speed, and pulling the throttle back, but this didn’t solve anything.
They heard the gear horn, and thought “This is because we are way too fast. I’ve never heard it before, becasue I’ve never been this fast on an approach.”
They became fixated with this unusual problem, and very anxious. Anxious to the point that they excluded all other inputs apart from the ASI.
Perhaps they were new to type too, further limiting their spare brain capacity.
As a result, the totally missed the problem.
What they should have done was recognised that they were overloaded and decided to go around when they still had time, and think about what was wrong.
But recognising that you’re overloaded can be difficult (because you don’t have time to think about that!), and actioning a go-around because of that must be instinct. If it’s not, you’ll never get enought time to catch up mentally, to make the decision to go-around.
Anyone who looks at that video and thinks “Idiots! The bloody warning horn is telling them what’s wrong! I’d never do that!” is missing an important lesson in human factors, and a good learning opportunity. Perhaps it’s a lesson that they don’t need to learn because they already know, but I still think it’s worth thinking about.
Two years ago, I was landing on a short grass runway in the UK beside some coastal cliffs. There was little room for error, so I was very focused on hitting the start of the runway at the correct speed. To make things harder, there was a strong, gusty cross wind. Strong gusty cross winds aren’t usually an issue for me (coming from Ireland, I get plenty of practice!). I had the speed nailed (well as nailled as you can have in blustry conditions)! I was on track to hit the start of the runway, at the correct speed, but something wasn’t right. I was flying a wing down approach (as I usually do), and I was constantly having to remove the correction, re-position and apply the correction again.
Now that can happen in very gusty conditions, but it just didn’t seem right. SOMETHING was wrong, but I couldn’t find out what. So I went around and gave myself time to think about what was wrong. But of course there was a strong temptation to keep going and sort it on the runway, knowing that I was going to make the begining of it at the correct speed.
On the second approach, everything became clear. The wind sock was only a 50% wind sock! The other half had been ripped off/blown away/worn away. As a result, the visual perspective of the sock created an optical illusion where my mind expected to see a full length wind sock, I created a picture to fit, which gave me wind form the opposite direction! I’d been applying the total opposite of the wind correction needed.
This is where I think you need to decipline to recognise that “something just isn’t right” and go around to give yourself thinking time. But it’s harder to make that decision when you’re overloaded (as say compared to when you know what you’re doing but struggling to get it precise eg. gusty wind conditions).
Colm
