Had Habsheim been flown with the same profile with a B737, the same crash would have happened.
Why?
At Habsheim the guy attempted to fly up against the alpha floor just for the hell of it. Equivalent of stamping on the brakes as hard as you can just to prove the ABS will stop you locking up.
I don’t think it’d have happened in a B737 because they wouldn’t have been doing that stunt.
One CRM case study involved a crash where the crew went off piste the QRH and pulled some circuit breakers in flight, which in turn resulted the Airbus taking two minutes for the FBW to re establish. This occurred low level and the airliner flew into a forest. It may be an oversimplification of Habsheim, or a separate accident? I know it is used as an example why you can’t pull CBs unless required in the QRH or authorised by an engineer.
The french CAA wittheld the Habsheim Crash Recorders. The last seconds were missing.
There was a Bulletin that there are problems with barometer accuracy (100ft on MCP and indicated on altimeter resulted in actual 30ft AGL).
The pilots for all they knew were at 100ft, then realized the trees were coming close, fast, and then it took 5 seconds for spool up.
The french CAA wittheld the Habsheim Crash Recorders. The last seconds were missing.
Why would they do that? To protect a “national” company?
… and how exactly, given that the FDR read-out in the accident report (last page of appendix 7) clearly ends with the impact?
This book from 2013 provides a lot of insight into this accident. Have looked at some chapters but plan to read it through.
https://www.kobo.com/gb/en/ebook/understanding-air-france-447
Just had a look at the above post. The link was posted without comment which is sometimes a good idea 
This is interesting
One thing I tend to notice relating to high profile air crashes (the French Concorde one being another – this book contains absolutely damning stuff about both the crew and the BEA) is how stuff comes out years later which was
This book from 2013 provides a lot of insight into this accident. Have looked at some chapters but plan to read it through.
Thank you – just ordered it.
Just finished the above book. Highly recommended.
We have all known from the extensive media coverage that the crew screwed up so badly it is hard to imagine, but there is a lot more to it, and the Airbus software (which btw varies quite a lot across the models) carries a lot of the blame.
There are darker aspects too, in the way of casual attitudes to safety, evidenced by not being too bothered about deviating around a huge TS, the captain being in his bunk, reportedly after a “heavy night out”, despite knowing rough wx was expected. Similar to the Concorde crash discussed here.
