AIUI the 737 door unlocks when both engines lose power. That was when he got in, so already with no fuel to fly anywhere.
The door may also unlock when pressurisation is lost; I vaguely recall reading that somewhere. But that would also need both engines to have failed, or a big hole in the cabin.
Airborne_Again wrote:
The purser had a CPL and with assistance from ground he would most likely have been able to bring the aircraft down on a runway in one piece. As it was he had to break down the cockpit door and when he finally got in it was too late.
No cockpit door remains locked if the crew is unresponsive inside, unless the safety feature to unlock it is broken. But that is rare, even though it does happen. Normally, this is a no-go item.
Components of the flight deck access system
include an emergency access panel, chime module, three-position door lock selector, two
indicator lights, and an access system guarded switch. The emergency access panel
includes a six button keypad for entering a numeric access code along with red, amber
and green lights.
The door was unlocked using this feature on Helios 522. It is only a pity this was done way too late. It is puzzling as well why the cabin crew did not open the cockpit door when the aircraft continued it’s climb despite the masks having fallen out.
It was a cabin attendant who had a UK CPL. It is pretty clear that it was this CA who tried to take over the airplane, but by the time he did, the airplane was out of fuel. He also was not located in front during the flight but in the aft galley, so it might have taken him a while to realize that nobody acted on the fact that they were flying in cruise while oxygen masks were deployed. Also he was not qualified on the 737 and was probably massively affected by hypoxia.
Had someone opened the cockpit door and the CPL qualified pilot had access during climb, chances are he could at the very least have descended the airplane to breathable altitudes, which at that time might have revived the cockpit crew. It is also quite probable that any qualified pilot who acts as cabin crew would have more than a small interest to inform himself about the type he was flying.
In the end, the Helios disaster was one big screw up. Maintenance left the packs in manual, so they did not pressurize the airplane. The cockpit crew did not catch that during preflight and did not identify what they thought was a take off config alert during climb as a cabin pressure alert. Subsequently, the cabin crew interfered too late to be able to do anything useful.
Cabin Attendant number four also held a UK Commercial Pilot License (JAR CPL A/IR)
with an issue date of 2 October 2003, and valid to 1 October 2008. His JAA Class 1
Medical Certificate was valid from 15 July 2005 to 17 July 2006
Here is a preliminary account by the FAA. Looks like the pax really didn’t have any experience. Amazing.
