Is it bs? AIUI lack of oxygen puts a strain on the heart.
It put a strain on all muscles because of lower SpO2, but if you have a correct health and do not smoke, it should be that a strain, although I knew soe people than are getting green over 8000ft. But I suppose that average swiss flyer in the Alps have a correct knowledge of its personnal tolerance, and doesn’t play with it with passengers.
About ADS-b Stuff, gliders don’t show up on adsb, so an adsb receiver or even emitter, in this case, wouldn’t have been a saver, only a flarm emitter-receiver in the DR400.
And that is actually what I would recommend.
Glider will never have ADS-B emitter, it’s far too much data and power demanded to the glider community in addition to what they call an intrusion into their freedom of flight. Whatever we think about this, the simple economic aspect is convincing.
But a very simple flarm emitter-receiver (already widely spread in glider comminity and increasing in UL) would have warned them both of a close encouter in the minute before the collision.
I don’t want to comment on the report – don’t have details and wouldn’t feel comfortable if I did. RIP.
But generally speaking for sure you can damage your heart permanently from transient oxygen supply/demand mismatch without blocked coronaries – ranging from probably not that great of a concern in most (e.g. elevated cellular death biomarkers in marathon runners, concern in some) to probably very bad outcome if not controlled quickly and efficiently (e.g. stress cardiomyopathy aka Takotsubo syndrome, concern in most).
FL130 without supplemental O2 is pushing it for healthy individuals, particularly if unadapted and/or the altitude change was quick as is the case for most flying. Not the environment you’d want somewhat less than healthy individuals to be in. Here is a nice recent review of specific effects in patients with coronary disease if you are interested.
Thanks for the article. It suggests there is a significant risk even at airliner cabin altitudes (8000ft mostly) but do any stats support this?
I wonder what reason the accident report writer had to stating that. Was something found in an autopsy?
The article I linked suggests risk at cabin altitudes for persons with unstable disease. Obviously CAT is survivable by reasonably healthy people all over the world all day long.
What I found tragic in this accident also is, that the glider pilot managed to bail out with his emergency parachute which was from the report functioning properly but died anyway. I wonder if that was due to a too low opening or mountainious/rocky terrain (cliff, steep slope…) after landing.
europaxs wrote:
I wonder if that was due to a too low opening or mountainious/rocky terrain (cliff, steep slope…) after landing.
2.2.4 Although the pilot of the HB-3412 was able to jettison the canopy, leave the cockpit and activate the release handle of his rescue parachute, the rescue was not successful. The steep descent of the glider in the direction of the steeply rising terrain combined to lead to a short time of 15 seconds between the collision and the impact on the ground. There is no indication that the rescue parachute was not functional. Accordingly, it must be assumed that the circumstances of the crash – in particular the position and movement of the glider and the associated forces acting on it, as well as the time conditions – were such that the pilot’s rescue attempt was unsuccessful.
Yes, apparently.
Concerning the heart issue:
1.4.2 […] The pilot had been suffering from coronary heart disease, which had rendered him unfit to fly. Following successful cardiological interventions and a positive performance test in 2018, the pilot became fit to fly again with conditions; at the time of the accident, the above-mentioned VML and SIC conditions were still in place.
The autopsy performed on pilot A showed damage to the heart muscle cells due to a lack of oxygen, which had occurred hours before the accident. Such cell destruction can disrupt the normal formation and conduction of excitation in the heart and thus trigger rhythm disturbances, which in turn can lead to reduced blood flow to the brain, combined with dizziness, a loss of psychomotor skills, impaired consciousness and even unconsciousness and seizures.
A combination of pre-existing heart disease and a lack of physiological reserves can lead to impaired fitness to fly and even loss of the ability to act (incapacitation).
UdoR wrote:
both had FLARM installed but the DR400 was neither transmitting nor receiving due to that issue with the updates (without updates the FLARM device stops working, intentionally!!). The devices from AirAvionics do sound an alarm if the firmware is not updated, but in this case they muted the alarms.
There are a couple of things which strike me in this report with regards to the FLARM problematic.
The glider had a modern Power-Flarm fusion device active and running. That device is capable of showing ADS-B as well as FLARM signals. It also had a transponder with ADS-B out which was switched off. Unlike the legacy Power Flarm portable, the Power Farm Fusion does apparently NOT show A/C transponder signals.
The Robin had a Garrecht TRX-2000 which can show ADS-B, Transponder (Mode C) and Flarm. However, the FLARM module was not working because a mandiatory update had been missed. Unfortunately, according to the SUST, this means it would not show anything at all. And it was most probably switched off.
So BOTH airplanes had the full monty of anti collision devices. Yet, the way they used their devices prevented them from seeing each other. That is unacceptable imho.
- The Glider had it’s transponder switched off, probably due to the old wife tale that the battery won’t support the transponder. Had the transponder been operating, the TRX-2000 would have seen the ADS-B outputs and displayed them on the device in the Robin despite the disabled FLARM module.
- The Robin had it’s Flarm module disabled due to a missing update. It had a transponder which worked, but had no ADS-B out. Hence it was not visible to the glider’s PF Fusion device because this device does not show A/C signals.
So from the anti collision system side, there were two major factors which caused this accident:
→ The switched off transponder in the glider and the disabling of the FLARM functionality due to the missing update. Either of the two would have made the opposing traffic visible to the other.
→ It is a great pity that the PF fusion system does no longer show A/C signals. While it only had shown a range ring and delta altitude, it would have made the glider pilot aware of a traffic nearby at same altitude.
I have to say, when it comes to anti collision devices I fully support the findings of the SUST in these cases. Lessons learnt out of this are pretty straight forward:
- Any transponder which is available on an airplane MUST be switched on at all times. Period. It is a rule already, but needs enforcing and imho much more relevant to flight safety than minor airspace violations. Nobody should have any reason whatsoever to fly with his transponder off.
- Flarm has to stop disabling their devices when the updates are missing. It has happened to me as well that I got on the airplane and found out that I had missed to upgrade the PF device and it refuses to switch on. This is unacceptable. It can nag, bleep or do whatever it wants, but it must continue working.
And my addition: Flarm should bring back A/C sginals into their PF devices.
Snoopy wrote:
The main takeaway is get rid of Flarm etc and just get over and done with an EASA wide ADSB-out mandate like in the US. Those perished in this accident would have had 3 nice years since the accident.
I disagree with getting rid of FLARM, but fully support the demand that ADS-B out should be compulsory on any airplane, glider and other objects flying around. FLARM has got it’s functionality and not least it can be a very viable tool for SAR as well, as this case has shown. In addition FLARM is the only possibility for paragliders and similar devices. The best possible way to combine both worlds is to have devices like PF which are capable of displaying both FLARM and ADS-B.
Also some devices stop transmitting ADS-B out if e.g. no flight plan is loaded. This is something we have in our setup with a GNS430W and the Trig transponder. Flarm will be a backup in such a case.
And unless ADS-B becomes compulsory, PF should be upgraded to show Mode A/C again as the legacy PF portable does. I’ve had several encounters where that functionality has given me the possibility to do a vertical avoidance of an airplane which only had A/C.
As for the SAR side of things: It is remarkable to see that it was the private SAR FLARM expert who got his stuff together fast, correct and even had a correct hunch about two airplanes being involved. The FLARM infrastructure allows a very fast and reliable localization of any missing airplane based on their data stream and therefore I agree with the SUST that they should most definitely become a part of the SAR RCC setup and fully recognized for their capabilities.
One can read a certain amount of understandable frustration in that report when they keep listing their efforts to improve the situation.
I’ve got ADSB and FLARM in, and it’s shocking how many aircraft I pass that are not sending either.
